The UK has to decide whether to join the other members of the EU in a monetary union. This choice depends in part on the outturns for the economy inside and outside EMU. The UK has chosen to target inflation, and this can involve some 'price level drift', whilst the ECB emphasises 'Price Stability' and would plan to reverse the drift in the price level that might be caused by external shocks such as an increase in the oil price. This paper discusses the intellectual foundations of the ECB policy, which is rooted in German Ordoliberalism. It compares these ideas with the more Anglo-Saxon approach embedded in inflation targets. These regimes are then compared over the future using a large macro model (NiGEM) which includes descriptions of all the European economies. It is repeatedly subject to historically representative shocks. The effects of these shocks on the UK and Europe are compared with the UK in and out of EMU. Membership of EMU helps stabilise inflation and the price level in the UK, but leaves output more volatile. The differences depend on the rules in place and on the set of shocks applied to the model. The paper concludes with a discussion of the options available to the UK.
Introduction 4
The central objective of the UK Government is to achieve high and stable levels of growth and employment and the case for joining Economic and Monetary Union, EMU, will be judged against this criteria. The Government's policy towards EMU is that it will join "if , in the end, a single currency is successful, and the economic case is clear and unambiguous" 5 . The government has proposed five economic tests that will have to be met. The five tests are:
• Are business cycles and economic structures compatible so that we and others could live comfortably with Euro interest rates on a permanent basis?
• If problems emerge is there sufficient flexibility to deal with them?
• Would joining EMU create better conditions for firms making long-term decisions to invest in Britain?
• What impact would entry into EMU have on the competitive position of the UK's financial services industry, particularly the City's wholesale markets?
•
In summary, will joining EMU promote higher growth, stability and a lasting increase in jobs?
The answers to these questions may depend on the implications of uncertainty for the economy and the effect of EMU on uncertainty. We therefore need to gauge uncertainty in a relatively formal way. The purpose of this paper is to examine the case for UK entry into EMU using the National Institute's Global Econometric model, NiGEM. It is a large econometric global model, with forward looking behaviour in financial markets and labour markets and full working models of all 6 European countries. It is therefore an appropriate tool for answering detailed questions concerning European Monetary Union.
Evaluating how the UK would respond to different shocks under different exchange rate and interest rate regimes can be done using deterministic simulations. This would give us insight into the effects of particular shocks for the UK and European economies. However, the case for UK entry would require evaluating the effects under a number of different shocks. Evaluating different exchange rate regimes for the UK using deterministic shocks is of great value as it can give a clear comparison of the effects of specific shocks when the UK is in and out of EMU 7 . However, we live in an uncertain world and the evaluation of the UK's membership of EMU should 3 be undertaken by applying a number of random shocks. Analysing the ability of the UK economy to deal with repeated shocks is the most effective way to evaluate the case for UK entry. Hence, we use stochastic simulation techniques to analyse the likely macroeconomic performance of the UK when in and out of EMU.
The purpose of this paper is to quantify the effectiveness of the two regimes in stabilising the UK economy 8 . In terms of the government's economic tests, we investigate the likely volatility of the UK economy under both regimes. This requires that we discuss the rationale for the rules that we use and accept that the monetary regime inside EMU may be completely different from that outside. With the UK outside EMU we set UK monetary policy to be inflation targeting and the ECB to follow a combined price level and inflation targeting rule. Once inside EMU the UK would not have any monetary discretion. We also compare periods of relative calm and periods of relative turbulence, and attempt to draw out their different implications. We discuss the rationale for the two rules, and draw a distinction between price stability, or price level targeting, and inflation targeting. These distinctions are relatively deeply embedded in the philosophical foundations of the state, and we have to look at the formation of the German state in order to fully understand them.
There is of course a literature in this area, although it does not always use the same style of model or the same techniques as we do. In addition, different approaches have different ways of evaluating outcomes, and it is not at all clear what should enter the objective function of the policy maker, nor is it clear what the appropriate weights are if there are multiple objectives. Minford et. al. (1992) for instance discuss the Exchange Rate Mechanism and floating exchange rates using a large macro model with some forward looking elements and concludes that floating rates are better than fixed mechanisms. However, it is important to note that they assume that the exchange rate as described by their equation is not subject to random shocks. Brigden and Nolan (1999) use a very simple calibrated model to estimate output and inflation variabilities for the UK. They use their model to derive welfare loss estimates under a monetary union and when interest rates are set according to domestic conditions. They simply minimise a loss function with arguments of inflation and output subject to a Phillips Curve. For the monetary union model, everyone within EMU is assumed to have a common inflation rate and a common target. Brigden and Nolan suggest that the welfare loss from membership is equivalent to a permanent reduction in GDP of up to 2%. The model is static and there are no linkages between countries. i.e. it's a closed economy model.
Monetary policy also affects the economy through exchange rate channels as well as through the interest rate effects on domestic demand and the choice of a 'best' monetary policy rule may change when working in an open economy framework. Svensson (2000) extends the analysis of inflation targeting to a small open economy model where the exchange rate plays a prominent role in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and shows that by targeting variables other than just inflation, the variability of other economic variables is reduced. In order to take account of the variability of these other variables it is necessary that small models are expanded to include them, and that we work in an open economy framework. Hence there is a strong case for analysing the question of UK entry into EMU using a large open macro-economic model. Indeed, in Barrell, Dury and Hurst (1999) we show that exchange rate uncertainty matters for small open economies such as the UK.
The paper is set out as follows. Section 2 discusses price level stability and its conceptual foundation in the work of the German Ordoliberals. Section 3 sets out the policy environment used in this analysis. Section 4 gives a summary of the techniques used to undertake stochastic simulations on NiGEM. Section 5 provides a brief overview of NiGEM and Section 6 reports the results of the simulations on the variability of certain economic variables. The final section concludes.
Price Stability
It is important in this context to discuss the objectives that are set for the monetary authority, and to put them in the context of the relationship between state and society.
There is a distinction to be made between inflation targeting strategies and those that embed some long run target for the price level, and we discuss this issue. Some simple analytics on price level drift are set out in an Annex. Some simple theoretical constructs on price level stability are well surveyed in a recent ECB paper (Smets, 2000) . Finally, we discuss at length the contract between state and society, and we rely, amongst other things, on Sally (1996) .
The formation of the ECB as a successor to the Bundesbank cannot be ignored, and the intellectual foundations on which the latter was built are those that have been transferred to the newer institution. British economists have been trained in a utilitarian tradition where all actors are seen as maximising something, and institutions are designed in order that the objectives of the polity are achieved. Tradeoff's between objectives are part of this framework. We would normally write that the 'utility function of the policy makers includes both output and inflation, and that the central bank designs its policies to maximise welfare'. This ideal type is often then simplified into formal rules for behaviour, but with the concept of maximising over multiple, equally valid, objectives with multiple instruments and multiple constraints. This is not as useful for the analysis of institutions in Europe as many Anglo-Saxon economists think.
The German state was reconstructed after the last war with several objectives in mind. A liberal, supply side policy framework was established under Ludwig Erhardt and Konrad Ardenauer between 1948 and the early 1960s, and was based on the writings of German Ordoliberals. Many British economists will be familiar with the writings of Hayek, who was associated with this group. The policy framework was one of decentralisation of power and decision making, where the state was seen as the source of rules of behaviour for the proper functioning of the market economy and the democratic state, rather than an actor in itself. The ideas and the implementation of them reflect the two, probably related, catastrophes of the German inter-war period.
The horrors of the hyper-inflation in 1923 and its effects on property rights and the concept of long term contracts were close to the minds of the Ordoliberals, especially as they saw the collapse of long-term contracts as one of the progenitors of the political movements that brought down the Weimar Republic. The state, they insisted, was to set the rules, and individuals were to maximise within those rules.
The two core areas for policy concerned the guarantee of price stability and the promotion of competition. The former was seen as essential for a society where long term contracts could act as the cement of civil society, whilst the latter was seen as necessary to prevent the accumulation of power into just a few hands. Price stability was seen as central to the implied contract between state and society that underlay all economic and political decision making. That contract was to be constructed so individuals could write their own contracts in real terms, knowing that the objective of the monetary authorities was to maintain price stability. This was seen to encourage long term decision making and the emergence of respect for civil society. In order to ensure that the central objective of price stability was maintained in the face of needy politicians facing electoral constraints, the constitution had to have an explicit role for an independent central bank. The central bank's overall objective was to maintain price stability, and in essence prevent any sub-group from usurping power through recontracting.
The Ordoliberals wanted to construct a 'private law society' designed to protect the individuals right to trade their private property and to enter into private contracts with others. Decentralisation of society in this way makes it heavily dependent on rules guided behaviour, and in particular on the construction of a monetary policy framework based on simple rules. Maximising something leads to discussions of speeds of adjustment, time horizons and policy trade-offs, and it is difficult to see how monetary policy can be decentralised and de-politicised in this context. As Sally (1996) says 'The objectives of a free economic order are thus twofold; and, in conjunction with interdependent social and legal orders, enable individuals, in the Kantian sense, to be ends in themselves, not means towards the achievement of others' ends.' (p238).
Many of the ideas of the Ordoliberals are common to Classical Political Economy, but as Eucken (1951) stresses, the primacy of currency policy makes their views stand out. This concept has been very influential in post-war German monetary policy conducted by an independent Bundesbank. The independence of the Bundesbank and its commitment to price level stability has been stressed by Bernholz (1989) for instance, and the links between Ordoliberalism and the behaviour of the Bundesbank has been discussed on a number of occasions by Tietmayer, (for instance in 1992 in his LSE lecture). It could be argued that the Ordoliberal and the Bundesbank constitution have a lexicographic ordering with price level stability taking precedence in the first branch of the objective function, and then other variables such as output and unemployment being considered as secondary objectives.
The ECB has inherited the same degree of independence, and by constitution it is equally committed to price level stability. In setting this policy framework it accepts that in the medium term any drift in the price level has either to be reversed, or explicitly accepted into the price level, as was the oil price shock of 1979-80. The commitment to the maintenance of the ability to write simple, enforceable, contracts in real terms is reflected in the target range for the inflation rate of between 0 and 2 percent. It is acknowledged that goods improve in quality more rapidly than the share of labour and the level of wages can be adjusted. Hence measured prices drift up, but the underlying true price index is kept stable in this framework.
It is clear from this discussion that we have to analyse the choice the central bank faces when there is a shock to the economy. It can choose to allow base level drift, or it can return to a well defined deterministic price level 9 . As Niehans (1980) stresses, we can separate the functions of the central bank by looking at the three cycles of policy. The short run concerns banking stability, the medium term concerns stabilisation, and the long run concerns price stability. To ensure that the third objective is fulfilled the central bank must plan to reverse inflation shocks. Shocks to the inflation rate are often discussed as if they were all positive, but we should accept that shocks are essentially symmetric, and hence can also be negative. In regimes of low inflation or near price stability negative inflation shocks, such as that induced by the Asian crisis, can be made more difficult to deal with if shocks are treated as bygones. In regimes of low inflation a price level target can mean that the deleterious effects of liquidity traps can be avoided. If the price level falls, and interest rates fall, a credible price level target will mean that all agents expect the price level to rise again. This expectation will keep prices and wages up and help prevent deflationary spirals developing.
In a simple model with a Lucas supply curve it is possible to show that price level targeting may dominate inflation targeting. For instance Svensson (1999) shows that if output is sufficiently persistent then price level targeting may reduce both output and inflation variability. The nature of the supply relationship is important here as Kiley (1998) shows. With a Phillips curve relationship in a new-Keynesian framework it is possible that output variability might be higher under price level targeting than under inflation targeting. However, if this model has Taylor style contracting based forward-backward wages or prices added to it, it is possible that one can design a policy rule that weights output so that inflation is more stable under price level targeting, as Vestin (1999) shows. Hence we would conclude that there is a sound case for a framework that has the level of a nominal variable, and preferably the price level as an explicit argument with sufficient weight to ensure that inflation variability is reduced.
One can construct an encompassing framework for analysing different monetary policy rules, and we do that in Barrell, Dury and Hurst (1999) and in Barrell, Dury and Hurst (2000) . We encompass inflation targeting and Taylor rules, neither of which embed a price level target within a framework that also includes monetary targeting and mixed nominal and inflation targeting of the form we suspect the ECB is operating. Of course each simple rule is an ideal type, an abstraction designed to get at the essence of behaviour. This paper can be seen as an extension of that work as well as a discussion of the foundations of different approaches to monetary targeting.
The Policy Environment

Monetary policy
In order to investigate the performance of the UK economy both in and out of EMU we need to give explicit form to the policy rules being followed by both the Bank of England and the ECB. When analysing the behaviour of the ECB we focus on combining a standard monetary policy rule, where the central bank targets some monetary or nominal aggregate 10 , with elements of an inflation targeting regime.
The framework within which we analyse rules can be written:
where r is the short term interest rate, π is the annualised domestic inflation rate, Y is log of nominal output and an asterix denotes target variables. We assume the ECB will follow this combined rule where both γ 1 and γ 2 are positive. It appears from Duisenberg (1998) that the ECB will adopt this approach and so in this paper we use this policy rule. The rule feeds back on the deviations of EMU wide nominal output and inflation from their target path.
When the UK is inside EMU, the EMU wide aggregates in the rule will, of course, include values for the UK. When the UK is outside EMU the Bank of England is assumed to set interest rate policy according to a pure inflation targeting rule where γ 1 is set to zero. We argue that these policy rules reflect current policy regimes, at least in an idealised sense. We also examine the case where the UK adopts the same framework as the ECB but stays outside the Union. In all cases we use a rational expectations approach, and hence any policy announcement is immediately fully credible. It is not clear that this is the situation in which the authorities would find themselves, especially in the UK, but it is a useful analytical starting point.
The rules in this paper use the Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation rate as a target.
11
The rules target the current rate of inflation and the current level of a nominal magnitude. It is sometimes argued that a measure of forecast inflation is more appropriate due to the lag in monetary policy affecting the economy 12 . However we believe it is likely that the ECB is actually reacting to what it perceives as current conditions, which are endogenous in our framework (and it is also the case that in a forward looking model current conditions are in part reflecting future outturns). For these reasons we concentrate on using current deviations from target in our rules.
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Fiscal Policy
In this paper we assume budget deficits are kept within bounds in the longer term, and taxes rise to do this. Governments are assumed to adjust tax rates slowly to offset any departure of their deficits from their target trajectories, and hence they remain solvent in the simulation (See Barrell and Sefton (1997) ). We can describe this fiscal rule as
where Tax is the direct tax rate, GBR and GBRT are the government surplus target and actual surplus, and φ is the feedback parameter designed to remove an excess deficit in less than five years.
It would be a valuable additional exercise to examine a scenario where fiscal policy is used to stabilise the economy, but we do not do that in this paper. Blake and Young (1998) show that the variability of output growth can be reduced when government spending is varied according to the economic cycle: spending rises when growth is slow and falls when growth is fast. This scenario would give further insight into the ability of fiscal policy to stabilise the UK economy when inside EMU.
Stochastic simulations
The world is constantly faced with shocks; they can be large and infrequent or small and frequent. It is impossible to know where the next major surprise will come from. By repeatedly addressing the model with different sets of shocks it is possible to evaluate the range over which a variable may fall. Stochastic simulations require that shocks are taken at random from a particular distribution and repeatedly applied to the 11 Issues arising from targeting the domestic inflation rate (where only inflation in the domestic component of the CPI, or GDP deflator) is targeted are dealt with in Svensson (1998) . 12 See Svensson (1997). model. From this the moments of the solution of the endogenous variables can be calculated and variability investigated. Stochastic simulations can be either in respect to the error terms, coefficient estimates or both. In this paper we assume that the coefficient estimates are known with certainty and the stochastic shocks to the model are only applied to the error terms, much as in the rest of the economic literature.
We use the boot strap method where the shocks are generated by repeatedly drawing random errors from individual time periods for all equations from the matrix of single equation residuals (SER), as in Blake (1996) . The shocks drawn will have the same contemporaneous distribution as the empirical distribution of the SER. In this way the historical correlation of the error terms are maintained across variables, but not through time. We have taken our model NiGEM, and calculated the historical shocks to all the structural equations for all 1000 estimated relationships. We first of all discuss results where we draw our shocks from the period 1993q1 to 1997q4 on the assumption that the near future will be similar to the near past.
14 We then go on to report results where we have drawn shocks from 1991q1 to 1997q4. This is a much more turbulent period, and the comparison of these two sets of results allows us to consider the issues associated with membership more closely.
Our set of structural shocks have been applied repeatedly to our forecast baseline which runs 24 years into the future. Each application produces a new future history that depends on the set of shocks applied, the 'counterfactual' baseline used and the period in which the shocks are applied. We have applied the shocks quarter by quarter over the period 1999 to 2003, running the model 'forward' to calculate the expectations that would be a reasonable response to the 'news' contained in the shocks. The model is solved for long enough to ensure the results are independent of the end points of the run. One replication in the set of stochastic simulations consists of shocking the model in the first quarter, solving forward for 18 years into the future. We then retain results from that quarter and repeat for each of the following 19 quarters we are shocking, using the output of the previous run as a new baseline. A set of replications involves doing this 200 times for each regime. Hence for the results reported in this paper we have a total of 4000 simulations per regime. We show in a previous paper that after approximately 100 stochastic simulations the variance of potential outcomes settles down 15 , and hence a sound assessment of the variabilities of outcomes under different regimes can be made with 200 trial runs and that further simulations would not change the results noticeably.
Shocking the Exchange rate
In this paper we include shocks to exchange rates, as we think that departures from our structural exchange rate relationships are important sources of uncertainty in the world we describe. However, this is not standard practice in these exercises, but this in part reflects the difficulties that these exercises involve. In our simulations we assume that exchange rate markets are forward looking, and exchange rates 'jump' when there is news. An anticipated and sustained fall in interest rates in, say, Japan, will cause the Yen/dollar rate to jump in the first period 16 . The size of jumps depends on the effects on interest rates that are anticipated for the future, and these in turn depend on the nature of the policy rules that are perceived to be in place. Hence policy rules affect financial markets. However, This relationship cannot be seen as exact, and any exchange rate uncertainty must be taken into account in the model and we do this by including shocks to the exchange rate in the stochastic simulations.
It is important to establish how the historical shocks are to be constructed when conducting stochastic simulations on a large econometric model. This is particularly relevant when stochastic simulations are being used to answer questions concerning EMU. The construction of historical shocks to sterling is clear, as the bilateral rate against the dollar existed in the past, as did the rates for Japan, Canada, Sweden and so on. However, we are simulating the model with an exchange rate equation for the Euro, a currency that did not exist in the past. Moving from the a regime where individual Euro area countries have their own exchange rates to one where there is single exchange rate for EMU members, introduces some uncertainties as to what shocks to apply to the Euro. We could construct a set of shocks to the Euro that was the weighted average of shocks to the individual currencies over the past. However, this would not necessarily be the correct strategy, as EMU has been set up, and hence shocks across bilateral rates within the Union are no longer possible. A better strategy, we believe, would be to apply the shocks that occurred to the core of EMU (Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, France (and Austria)) over the historical periods being considered, and we adopt this for the Euro. However, this means that we are applying a subset of historical shocks, especially to the European Monetary Union and to the US, as in the latter case shocks to the exchange rate are the result of shocks to all US dollar bilateral rates. Hence we may be reducing the dimensions of the sets of shocks that our counterfactual worlds face. However, this does not prevent us drawing conclusions from experiments in such worlds.
The model
NiGEM is an estimated model, which uses a 'New-Keynesian' framework in that agents are presumed to be forward-looking but nominal rigidities slow the process of adjustment to external events. The theoretical structure and the relevant simulation properties of NiGEM are described in Sefton (1997) and NIESR (2000) . The model has a full description of all the economies of the OECD, including South Korea. China is also modeled separately and there are regional blocks for East Asia, Latin America, Africa, Miscellaneous Developing countries, and Developing Europe. Each economy has a supply side, a demand side, and a full set of asset accumulation relationships including a complete set of government sector, foreign sector and private sector financial accounts 17 . There is a longer description of the model in Annex II.
Policy analyses on large models must be constructed carefully. Individuals form expectations, and these affect behaviour. If we ignore this, either when estimating relationships or when implementing the description of the world we have constructed, then our model either will not describe the real phenomenon or it will not replicate the reactions embedded in that reality. In addition our relationships should describe the underlying structure and not just reflect a statistical description of the past, and therefore structural relationships have to be constructed carefully in order that we can take account of recent changes in the underlying reality. Hence we have to take account of endemic structural change and this allows us to answer the so called Lucas Critique of policy analysis on large models. This involves more than just assuming that expectations of the future are rational evaluations of possible outcomes.
We have attempted to do this in several ways. All equations on the model are tested for structural stability, and the policy analyses we report utilises the description of behaviour that we think most likely represents the Europe in which we will be living in the next few years, rather than the average of past but evolving behaviour. This involves both judgement and calibration of the model as well as estimation, and hence the model is a representation of the structure we feel is in place. We have taken account of the structural changes involved in recent labour market reforms, and we have looked carefully at the effects of the process of European integration on the structure of trade and production 18 . Labour markets are presumed to involve forward looking behaviour, as are financial markets, and we use model consistent rational expectations in all of our results.
Results
We analyse three scenarios in this paper. Two are constructed when the UK is not a member of monetary union and UK interest rates are set according to domestic conditions. The UK is either inflation targeting or following our standard combined rule. We also analyse the situation where the UK is inside EMU, the exchange rate between UK and the Euro is fixed and interest rates are set according to Euro wide aggregates. We assume that the ECB sets interest rates according to a combined nominal aggregate and inflation-targeting regime (the two-pillar strategy). We also look at two different worlds. In the first we draw shocks from the relatively stable recent past, starting in 1993q1 and running to 1997q4. We compare this to results using shocks drawn from the much more volatile period for the seven years from 1991q1 19 , and hence we can evaluate whether the institutions we have are robust against periods of greater innate volatility. Table 1 compares the volatility of economic variables for the UK and for EMU as a whole under the three regimes. We concentrate on the variability of the level of output, the price level and the inflation rate over our trial period of five years. An index value is also shown for the variability of results as compared to inflation targeting with the UK. We have the UK both inside and outside EMU, and we also have it following a combined rule when outside EMU. Where stochastic simulations give a lower variability than under our base rule of inflation targeting in the UK the box is shaded and a * indicates that the difference is significant at the 5% level.
Note: UK OUT (INF) = UK out of EMU, UK is inflation targeting, EMU following a combined rule UK OUT (CR) = UK out of EMU, UK and EMU following a combined rule UK IN (EMU = CR) = UK in EMU, EMU following a combined rule
Outside EMU, the UK can use monetary policy to stabilise the economy. We first look at inflation targeting in a period of relative calm, and given our policy regime output variability is 0.75, which is some 50% higher than it was in our draw period 20 whilst inflation variability is almost half that seen in the draw period. This suggests that the policy framework we are analysing is not quite the same as that in use in the draw period, and that inflation targeting puts more weight on inflation and less on output than we observed the authorities doing in the mid 1990s. In particular we have no explicit fiscal feedback rule that would help stabilise output, and hence we do not have an idealised description of fiscal policy during the draw period, nor of fiscal policy as it may operate in future. If the UK moved to a combined framework where a nominal aggregate and the inflation rate were both targeted, both output and the price level are stabilised, much as we would expect. If the UK joins EMU and if we see a repeat of the rather stable period we have seen between 1993 and 1997, then there is likely to be a significant increase in output variability and significant declines in the variability of inflation and the price level. 21 However, we argue that institutions should be built in a robust way, and not just in the hope that things will go well. The period from 1991 was much more turbulent, especially for the UK and particularly in relation to the exchange rate.
Even if we face a period of relative calm, membership of EMU would still reduce uncertainty in the price level and in the inflation rate. This result stems from idiosyncratic shocks to the UK exchange rate that membership removes, and as we stress in Barrell, Dury and Pain (2000) , the exchange rate is a major source of price uncertainty in the UK. The other members of the Monetary Union almost beyond doubt benefit from UK membership, even in a world with little turbulence. As can be seen from Table 1 , the variability of output, inflation and the price level for the expanded union all fall as compared to the same variabilities in the narrower union without the UK. Hence we can reasonably conclude that the other members of the union would unambiguously welcome UK membership as it would reduce the dimensions of the shock pattern that they face. This result is strengthened if we consider the possibility that we face a turbulent future, as can be seen from Table 2 . We repeat our exercise, but apply shocks from 1991q1 to 1997q4 to the baseline we have constructed for the near future. The draw period is much more turbulent, with the variability of output around trend in the UK being double that in the shorter period, and inflation variability is very slightly higher than in the shorter period of greater calm. See Barrell, Dury and Hurst (1999) for the source of these comparisons. 21 This is in contrast to Blake and Young (1998) who find that inflation variability and output growth rise under monetary union. We should bear in mind that we have no formal framework for fiscal stabilsation in place, and as Barrell and Pina (2000) show, the Stability and Growth Pact leave significant amounts of room for more proactive fiscal policies.
Although independent monetary policy leaves the UK with the ability to reduce output variability as compared to when in monetary union, the gain is not so great in a more turbulent world. Membership of EMU in this world does ensure a great deal more inflation stability, and there is a significant improvement in the stability of prices. We have argued in section two above that there is a good case for stressing the medium term stability of the price level, and that in particular the framers of the Bundesbank and ECB constitutions had this concept in mind when setting them up. Indeed, we have argued that price level stability takes a primary place in the objectives of these institutions, and that they should be judged lexicographically, with other objectives being clearly secondary. In order to assess the price stabilising properties of the regimes we consider, we look at the variability of the price level in the first year and in the final year (year five) of our trials. We would argue that the objective of medium term price stability is better judged by the stability of the final, not the period average, price level. The mean reverting properties of a rule that contains a nominal aggregate are clear in Table 3 . The combined nominal aggregate and inflation target does significantly better in stabilising the price level at the end of the trial period than does inflation targeting, and membership of EMU improves further on this performance. This improvement is particularly marked if we think the future is liable to be turbulent. The price level in the monetary union at the end of the trial is also more stable if the UK joins. This is particularly noticeable when we face a period of turbulence rather than stability, and in section two above we argue that there is a strong case for seeing price stability as the prime long term objective of monetary policy. It is in a turbulent world that this becomes more important as an objective when designing institutions, and the possibility of an uncertain future strengthens the case for UK membership of EMU. However, the achievement of this objective will mean some loss of the stability of output in the short run.
Depending on the weights of the elements in the loss function, the UK may be better or worse off if it joins. Clearly part of the negotiation strategy would be to stress the importance to the UK (and to Millian utilitarian liberals) of output stability and the primacy of the welfare of individuals over the importance of the contract between state and society. A successful negotiation would have given the Europeans an impression that output stability is more important in the UK than it actually is and that any decision to join would have to be matched by significant side payments because of the increased welfare they gain from UK membership.
Welfare loss functions
We need to specify some welfare criterion in order to determine whether a monetary union regime or an independent monetary policy regime is superior. The loss functions are a combination of output, inflation, interest rate and exchange rate instability. The RMS%D or RMSD can be used to calculate the loss functions, a simple loss function may include either the RMSD for the inflation rate alone or the RMS%D for real GDP alone or for the price level alone. Of course, we have to accept that the concept of a loss function is best associated with a utilitarian approach to the evaluation of policy. If rule guided action takes primacy, we might feel that these indicators are less useful than the evaluation of performance against a simple single criteria.
It is likely that policy makers, at least in the UK, will not focus solely on the variability of one variable and will be concerned with the variability of both output and inflation rates and so both will appear in their loss functions. They may also believe that other non-price variables are an indication of economic welfare. Large frequent fluctuations in the interest rate may be regarded as imposing costs on the economy and so may be included in the loss function and this may change the conclusions about the relative performance of the policy rules. The outcome of any loss function will depend on the particular variables included in the function and the relative weights on its arguments. Where the loss function has more than one argument, then equal weight is placed on each, and we look at output and price indicators as components of the welfare function. We compare the results for our two different draw periods, and naturally the loss functions differ depending on the nature of the world in which we expect to live.
Chart 2: UK Welfare losses, (UK OUT [INF] = 100) for different shock periods
Note: Shaded columns = W1 = Welfare loss function: Real GDP and inflation Black columns = W2 = Welfare loss function: Real GDP and Price level Chart 1 shows the index value of the welfare functions for the UK inside EMU compared to the UK outside EMU using inflation targeting, in both calm and turbulent periods 22 . With equal weights membership is preferred if the world is expected to be turbulent and the price level is included in the loss function. However this is not the case if the world is expected to be stable in the future. It is not necessary that the elements of the loss function enter with equal weights. If, for instance, output takes less than 37% of the total weight in the loss function and inflation takes the rest then, if the world were unstable, the UK would be better joining monetary union. If long run price level were to be considered in the welfare loss function, W1, rather than short term inflation, then a weight as low as 22% on the price level would still leave the UK better off joining EMU if the world were unstable 23 . Bryant et al (1993) . 23 For technical reasons we are not able to present the variability of the price level at the terminal date of the run. The mean reverting properties of the nominal aggregate based rule will mean that the variability of prices in 2017q1, the end of run, will be significantly less than it is at the end of the five year trial period. 
Conclusions
In this paper we have undertaken an analysis of different regimes, one where the UK is inside monetary union and another where the UK stays outside monetary union. The National Institute's Global Econometric Model, NiGEM, was used to evaluate the performance of the UK economy under the different regimes. We did this by applying stochastic simulations techniques, that is by repeatedly applying shocks to the model and then calculating the subsequent variances of economic variables.
Results show that the volatility of UK output in a monetary union is likely to be greater than when outside. This is because one of main instruments of macroeconomic policy, the interest rate, is not available to offset any shocks. In terms of inflation variability or the stability of the price level, the UK would benefit in joining EMU. In terms of the tests put forward by the Government, the increased volatility of output is unlikely to promote higher growth and a lasting increase in employment, whilst the increase in long term price stability would aid growth and encourage investment. We must be clear on the relative importance of these factors in the determinants of growth and hence of welfare, and at present this is unclear.
If we think that we face a turbulent future, with a return to a period similar to that in 1991q1 to 1997q4, then the case for membership of EMU is strengthened. There is a strong argument for designing institutions that are robust in extreme circumstances, and the relative improvement in performance in EMU when we allow for more turbulence is a very important argument in favour of membership.
Annex 1
Price level determinacy
Let us expand the simple Taylor model described in Taylor (1999) to include real wealth effects and a wider class of monetary feedback rules. This simple analytical framework is sufficient to cover the class of models we wish to investigate, although the richness of expectational elements is not fully brought out. In particular, we do not feel that it is possible to undertake policy analysis without the assumption of rational expectations at least being considered, but Taylor's simple framework excludes these elements, and in this section we therefore do the same.
Consider the model, defined in terms of deviations from baseline:
) (
where y t is the percent deviation of real GDP from potential, π t is the inflation rate, p t is the price level, w t is nominal wealth and i t is the nominal short-term interest rate. e t and u t are serially uncorrelated stochastic shocks with a zero mean. Lower case denotes logarithms. Equation (1) is a conventional IS curve which relates output to the real interest rate and includes the possibility of wealth (or real balance) effects on demand. The parameters of the model are β 1 , β 2 and θ and are assumed to be positive. Equation (2) can be interpreted, as a conventional Phillips curve and equation (3) is the monetary policy rule used to close the model. In the more general model, the nominal interest rate is assumed to respond to deviations of inflation, price level and real GDP from their desired target paths. It is easy to show that the Taylor rule on the simple reduced model (i.e. no wealth effects) can leave the price level indeterminate in the sense that it depends upon the parameters of the model and not just on a target nominal variable.
We can expand equation (3) 
The slope of the aggregate demand curve therefore becomes a function of the parameters of the policy rule. Stability would require the slope of the AD curve to be negative, i.e. dy/dπ < 0. This would imply that a positive inflationary shock will result in a fall in y below zero (i.e. real output will be below potential output) and this will tend to reduce inflation and stabilise the model. After simplifying, the stability condition becomes:
This condition shows that the stronger the wealth effects the less important is the feedback coefficient on inflation. In the simple Taylor model there are no wealth effects and no direct feedback on prices, so we have γ 21 = θ = 0. Therefore stability requires γ 1 > 1.
Substituting (5) into (2) we get: 
where:
In the Taylor model with no wealth effects the second and third term of (7) drop out and we can show that for inflation to be a stationary series (i.e. I(0)) λ 1 < 1), the parameter on the inflation target in the policy rule to be greater than one, i.e. γ 1 >1. The is the same result as the earlier stability condition and also applies to the pure inflation targeting policy rule. We can use partial sums to show that the price level is a random walk that depends upon the parameters of the rule.
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The price level at period j is the partial sum from t=0 to t=j. In the long run with θ = 0 and γ 21 = 0 we have:
With the Taylor rule (and the pure inflation targeting rule) the inflation rate is stable i.e converges onto its equilibrium or target level but the price level is a random walk where transitions depend upon the model coefficients and the parameters of the feedback rules. There is no force driving the price level back onto its baseline trajectory path after shocks and so the price level is therefore indeterminate with this policy rule. Including wealth and/or changing the policy rule to a combined nominal GDP and inflation targeting rule, we can see that nominal wealth and/or the price level will appear in the inflation and aggregate demand schedule and will remove the price level indeterminacy.
Annex II
NiGEM is an estimated model that uses a 'New-Keynesian' framework in that agents are presumed to be forward-looking but nominal rigidities slow the process of adjustment to external events. The theoretical structure and the relevant simulation properties of NiGEM are described in Barrell and Sefton (1997) and NIESR (1998) . The model contains estimated structures for the whole world, with the major economies having 60-90 equation models with around 20 key behavioural equations. It has complete demand and supply sides, and there is an extensive monetary and financial sector. All countries in the OECD, including South Korea, are modeled separately, as is China. There are regional blocks for East Asia, Latin America, Africa, Miscellaneous Developing countries, and Developing Europe.
Short term interest rate changes should have an impact on long term interest rates, equity prices and exchange rates. NiGEM is most commonly used for scenario analysis under the assumption that expectations in financial markets are rational, in that they are fully consistent with the outcomes of an event given the reactions of policy makers. Hence financial variables can 'jump' in the first period of a scenario. These assumptions are adopted here. The size of the jump depends upon the interest differential that opens up. The anticipation of lower short-term rates will cause longterm rates to fall by the forward convolution of short term interest rate changes. Equity prices will rise when interest rates are anticipated to fall. Hence any shock that is expected to slow down activity will have its effects partly offset by the automatic shock absorbers in the monetary system. The size of the effect will depend upon the monetary rules used by the authorities.
Forward looking long rates have to look T periods forward 1) (1+LR t ) = Π j=1, T (1+SR t+j ) T We assume that exchange rate markets are forward looking, and exchange rates 'jump' when there is news. An anticipated and sustained fall in interest rates in Japan, say, will cause the Yen/dollar rate to jump in the first period 24 . The size of jumps depends on the effects on interest rates that are anticipated for the future, and hence policy rules affect financial markets.
Forward looking exchange rates have to look one period forward in simulation mode.
2) RX t = RX t+1 (1+SRH t )/(1+SRF t )
To calculate our stochastic shocks to the exchange rates we can either use this formula and assume that there is no stochastic shock to the exchange rate, or we can find some way of writing this calibrated equation so that we can distinguish shocks to it. We can proceed by assuming we had estimated the equation, using the actual value of RX t+1 and instrumented it because it is a proxy variable. We can then derive the estimation error (with that coefficient) as the residual that results, by substituting next period's actual RX into 2). Alternatively we could use the instrumenting equation to predict RX t+1 and calculate the resulting residual. We choose the former as a method for calculating exchange rate shocks.
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In our analyses labour markets are assumed to embody rational expectations, at least where we have evidence that bargainers use forward expectations, much as in Anderton and Barrell (1995) . Contracts are overlapping, and there are forward and backward elements in the wage equations, and they display dynamic homogeneity in (almost) all cases. The speed of adjustment of wages and prices is estimated to vary between countries, and depends upon institutions in the labour and product markets. In general the US and the UK react more quickly to excess capacity than do the more regulated continental European markets, and our results reflect these differences, as well as differences in the underlying structure of wealth and consumption. Further details of the model are available on request.
Wage equations can be written as 3) ∆W/P = λ[(W/P) t-1 -PROD] + β U t + δ ∆P e +(1-δ)∆P t-1 etc
Where W is the nominal wage, P is the price level, PROD is a long term measure of productivity and U is unemployment.
However consumers are not assumed to look forward when making their decisions today, but rather they react to current and past incomes and net financial wealth. This does not mean that future events do not affect their behaviour, as forward looking long rates and equity prices affect debt interest payments and asset values now. Hence financial markets bring forward the consequences of future events, acting as 'agents' for more passive households. Changing to forward looking household behaviour does not affect our results in any significant way. The model is large, but with a common (estimated and calibrated) underlying structure across all economies. The whole model is solved simultaneously in forward mode.
The forward-looking nature of these markets is central to model properties, and especially in shocks such as that in East Asia and Latin America. The model is solved in a sequence of loops, utilising the sparse structure of forward links in time. A shock is applied, and the model is run over the full time period, and interest rates are allowed to be endogenous. A fall in demand will, for instance, cut interest rates. Forward looking agents know this, and we emulate this knowledge by running the model a second time, but calculating the long rate as the forward convolution of short rates in the previous run. The model is continually run forward and starts again, and this is repeated until a solution is found where rates of growth of expected variables are constant at the terminal date, and all equations are converged. In particular, longterm interest rates are forward convolutions, and this period's exchange rate depends on that next period adjusted through the arbitrage condition but short term interest rate differentials. The monetary and fiscal policy rules are important in 'closing the model' and have been discussed in the previous section.
